










Evolutionary games have conaiderable unrealized potential for modeling anb-
atantive economic issues. They promise richer predictions than orthodox game
modele but often require more extensive specifications. Thie paper exposits the
apecification of appliwble evolutionary game models and classifies the posaible
asymptotic behavior for one and two dimensional models. It also summarizea a
sample application to the choice of firms' internal organization and the effects of
international trade.
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1 Introduction
By an evolutionary game, I mean any formal model of strategic interaction over time in
which (a) there is some inertia and (b) playera do not syatematically attempt to influ-
ence other players' future actions. Condition (a) diatinguishea evolutionary change from
revolutionary change and meana that aggregate behavior doea not change too abruptly.
Underlying reasons include various aorta of adjuatment coats, or informational imper-
fectiona, or perhapa bounded rationality. Condition (b), referred to below aa the game
againat Nature (GAN) condition, distinguiahes evolutionarygamea from repeated gamea
with trigger atrategy threata, etc. It can be juetified by appeals to large numbera of
playera, or to playera' myopia. t In recent yeara, economic theorista have found evo-
lutionary games to be very useful for investigating the foundations of game-theoretic
solution concepts, especially Nash equilibrium (NE) and refinementa (e.g. Binmore,
1991; Fudenberg 8t Krepa, 1991; Samuelson ót Zhang, 1991). There are aome economic
applications but they are not syatematic and sometimea borrow inappropriately from the
biological literature (Friedman, 1991).
The main purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the large unrealized potential
ofcvolutiunary gaiuc uwdcls for aubatantivic ecunomic applicationa. Compare.d to ortho-
dox game-theoretic approachea, the evolutionary game approach offera a wider range of
applicability for complete information (NE) models and perhapa a narrower range for
incomplete information (Bayesian NE) modela. Evolutionary gamea also offer a richer
aet of empirical predictions sucó as built-in selection criteria among multiple NE, and
predictiona of relatively rapid or elow convergence (or non-convergence) to NE. There ia
a cost, however. In addition to the orthodox specification of a payoff function (or game
tree), the evolutionary game modela uaually require apecification of initial conditiona (or
hiatory) and often also require apecification of adjuatment (or learning) dynamica.
The next section formally definea evolutionary game modela and discuasea their apec-
~Mailath (1992) adopts a narrower definition of evolutionary gamea in hie eurvey article. He reqrincs
bounded rationality, and aeeumea tbat interactiona coneiat of random matching and that atrategiee
(contingent action epeeifications) are obaervable. In my opioion, his deRaition ie too reetrietive for
purpoaee of conetructing applicable modeb.2
ification in some detail. In pasaing it aurveya some of the recent literature. Section 3
classifies the asymptotic behavior in the low dimensional modela which are likely to be
the moat useful for applications. Drawing heavily on Friedman 8c Fung (1992), Section
4 provides a sample application. It analyzes a mode! of how ínternational trade affects
firms' choice of internal organization. Some concluding remarka appear in Section 5.
Analytical details are collected in an Appendix.
2 Model Elements
Evolutionary games involve strategic interaction over time. At any point in time the
strategic interaction is expressed as a stage game, an ordinary static game either in
normal (strategic) form or in extenaive (game tree) form. For simplicity this paper
deals only with stage games in normal form. The reader interested in extenaive form
stage games should consult Fudenberg 8t Kreps (1988), Fudenberg 8z Levine (1991), or
Swinkels ( 1991). Weibull ( 1992) is a good introduction to evolutionary games based on
normal form stage games.
At each moment of time interactions occur among K~ 1 economically diatinct player
populations. Players in population k have Nk ~ 2 distinct actions (or pure strategiea),
k- 1, ..., K. Let s;` be the fraction of population k currently employing atrategy i.
Then sk -(s~,...,sN~) is a point in the Nk - 1 dimensional unit simplex repreaenting
the current state of population k, and the overall state s-(sr, .. . , sK) is a point in the
state apace S- St x... x SK. The fitnesa (evolutionary relevant payoff) to a population
k player using (possibly) mixed strategy r E Sk when the state is s E S ie fk(r,s),
where fk: Sk x S~ R are the components k- 1, . .., K of some apecified fitness (or
extended payoff) function f. An evolutionary game model conaists of a fitness function
f specifying the stage game, together with an associated dynamic F specifying how the
state changes over time. ~
~Readere who find thie paragraph opaque may be rea~ured to hear that in the moet useful applica-
tiona the atate epace S ie merely the line eegment [0, 1J or a equare or a triangle, that J often reducea
to a payoffmatrix, and that F ia often an ordinary difference or differential equation. By the end of the
aection thie all ahould be clear.3
Analyais of an evolutionary game typically focuses on the Nash equilibrium (NE)
of f and the evolutionary equilibria (EE) of F. (The definitiona: s' E NE(f) iff
fk(9'k, s') 1 f k(r, s') íor all r E Sk and k - 1, . .., K; and s' E EE(F) iff it ia a
locally asymptotically stable fixed point under F.) The focus ia appropriate becauae
only EE states are persiatent and robuat to small ahocka, hence empirically observable,
and because NE is quite generally a necessary condition for EE (e.g. Friedman, 1991;
Nachbar, 1990; Samuelson 8t Zhang, 1991).
Exiating theoretical literature can mislead the applied economiat. One could eaaily
get the impression that a refinement oí NE called ESS is important, that a particular
dynamic F called the replicator ia central, that interactions must be between randomly
matched players drawn from large populationa, and that behavior must be myopic or
even irrational. Theae apecifications for evolutionary games are natural for biological
applicationa and sometimes useful to economic theorista diacussing foundational iasuea,
but they are far too restrictive for moat economic applications. The reat of this aection
explicatea more general and useful specificationa of players, stage games, and dynamica.
A. Players and Strategies
The number K? 1 of populationa ahould repreaent the number of economically distinct
role8 in the model and Nk ~ 2 repreaents the number of alternative atrategiea available
to members of population k. Each population followa ita own evolutionary path ae it
interacts with the environment and (when K? 2) with other populationa. The inter-
national trade model worked out below involves two countriea whose firma may follow
separate evolutionary patha, so K- 2. The firma in each country choae between two
posaible modes of internal organization, so N~ - N~ - 2. The atate of each population
ia summarized by a point p between 0 and 1 representing the fraction of firma currently
uaing the firat mode, eo 1- p of the firma uae the second mode. Thus S' - S~ -[0,1~
and the state apace S- S' x S~ ia the aquare [0,1]~. Other natural K - 2 models
might have co-evolving populationa repreaenting buyers and aellera, or representing gun
producera and butter producers.
The number of populations can alwaya be reduced to K- 1 by symmetrizing the4
game or by expanding Nt - N to cover several role-contingencies (Selten, 1980; Cripps,
1991). This device is useful for theoretical purposes but can short-circuit an application.
In the gun-butter application, the role-contingent reduced model puts each entrepreneur
sometimes in the gun sector and sometimes in the butter aector, and asaumes that his
effectiveness as a gun producer dependa in patt on hia effectiveness as a butter producer.
The unreduced K- 2 model with separate evolutionary paths for each sector seems
more sensible. 3
There is only one way to get a one-dimenaional state space: K- 1 and N- 2 so
S-[0,1], as in the isolated single country part of the international trade model. There
are two types of two-dimensional state apaces: the square S-[0,1]~ arising from K- 2
and Nt - Nz - 2 as in the trade model, and the triangle. The triangle arises from a
single population (K - 1 and Nl - 3); since the population fractions are non-negative
and sum to 1.0 we can describe the state as S- T-{(p,q, l- p- q) : 0 C p,q and
p ~- q C 1}. There are three types of three-dimensional state spacea: the cube [0,1]3
for K- 3, Nt - Nz - N3 - 2; the prism T x [O,1J for K- 2, Nl - 3, Nz - 2(e.g. a
buyer-seller game where buyers have 3 strategiea and sellers have 2); and the tetrahedron
(3-simplex) for K- 1, N- 4. Higher dimensional state apaces often are intractable and
therefore are less useful in applicationa.
Most formal evolutionary game models assume there are infinitely many individual
players in each population. The assumption serves three purposes. First, it allows the
analytic convenience of a continuous state space and dynamics specified by ordinary dif-
ferential equations or difference equations. A finite population specification, by contrast,
restricts the current state s to some finite lattice, and a large Markov tranaition matrix
(or something even more cumbersome) is then required to specify the dynamics. Second,
the law of large numbers can be invoked for an infinite population so one can ignore
random fluctuations and differing perceptions of the current state. Third, and perhaps
most important, each individual can be regarded as small so the GAN condition is easily
justified.
gOne poeeible candidate for reduction to K- 1 ia a worker-consumer model in which an individual'e
fitnesa is the aimple average of her fitnese as a worker and her fitneee ea a conaumer.5
In practice, all three purposes can be adequately served by fairly amall actual popu-
lations. The approximationa involved in modeling the state space as a continuum and in
ignoring random fluctuations, etc, often are less troublesome than the numeroua other
simplifications required to conatruct a tractable model of aome aepect of economic re-
ality. The real issue is whether individuale syatematically attempt to influence other's
future behavior. For market interactiona, Iaboratory evidence (Smith, 1982) and some
field evidence (Bresnahan 8t Reiss, 1991) suggest that in terms of behavior, three buyers
(or three sellers) can be a"large number~. In general, the applied modeler muat uae her
own judgement on this matter.
The international trade model below makes no explicit assumptions regarding the size
of the populations. Indeed, once the continuum approximation is granted, the actual
population aize could be growing or declining over time; any size effects are captured in
the fitness function specification. The numerical examples in Friedman 8z Fung, 1992
usually assume ten firms in each country.
Some theorists have actually used an evolutionary game model to analyze a situation
in which each population consists of a single individual (e.g. Skyrms, 1986; see also
Binmore, 1987-88). The interpretation of the state s then ia the profile of mixed atrategies
contemplated by the individual players. The dynamica represent an internal or virtual
adjustment proceas for beliefs. I will discuss examples in Subsection C below. Obvioualy
the GAN asaumption is more problematic in this individualistic interpretation.
B: The Fitness Function
The fitnesa function f(r, s) specifiea the stage game, the population interactiona at a
moment of time. Most existing literatureemphasizes one of two linear specificationa. The
first, dubbed the aymmetric case by Maynard Smith ( 1982) involves a single population
(K - 1) and an N x N matrix A-((a;~)). Players are drawn randomly in pairs and
receive expected payoff 4 f(r, s) - rTAs when playing mixed strategy r, a point in the
~The T-euperecript denotee the tranapoee. All vectore are column vectore, but (except in matrix
multiplication) they are writteu for typographicsl eimplicity es row vectore witó the T euperscript
auppreseed.6
N-simplex S- {(x1,...,xN) : x; 1 0 and ~Nx; - 1}, against a population which
in aggregate plays mixed strategy s E S. The second popular linear case, somewhat
misleadingly referrPd to as the asymmetric case, involvea two populations (so s-(s~, s~)
where each s' is a point in the N-aimplex) and two N x N matricea, A and B.6 The
payoff functions are fl(r,s) - rTAs~ and f(r,s) - rTBsl.
These apecifications are useful for simple illustrative examplea but are too reatrictive
for most economic applications. In the first apecification there is only one economic role,
and the population interacts with itself. In the second there are two distinct roles, but
each player interacts only with playera in the other population, not with players in his
own population, e.g. fl(r,s) depends on s~ but not on sl. In the international trade
example, by contrast, firms in the home country compete in the market with foreign
firms, but also with other home country firms. A more general linear specification for
K - 2 and Nl - NZ - N could be written uaing two other N x N matricea C and D as
f~(r, s) - rT(As2 f Cs~) and f~(r, s) - rT(Bs~ -F Ds~).
Linear specifications are useful but inauf6cient for many applications. Pairwise ran-
dom matches are usually economically less important than market interactions, and
market interaction typically give evolutionary relevant payoffs that are non-linear in the
state s. Other than Friedman 8s Fung (1992), the main example in exiating literature
is the work of Blume and Easley on wealth dynamics in financial markete, e.g. 1991.
On the other hand, it is reasonable in most applications to regard players as esaentially
risk-neutral with respect to single-period payoffs. Then the fitness function can be taken
as linear in its first argument r. It is analytically quite tractable to apecify fk(r,s) as
linear in r and continuously differentiable in s(Friedman, 1991), so unleas otherwise
stated such fitneas functions will be assumed below.
C. Dynamics
Evolution of the state s E S over time can be stochastic or deterministic and in discrete or
continuous time, and allowable states can be the whole continuum S or a diactete aubset.
óThe reader ehould be wazned that aome of the literature epeeifies BT rather than B, which can
cause some confusion.7
For concreteness and simplicity I will deal mainly with determiniatic, continuous-time,
continuous-state dynamics and refer to other forma only as necessary. Inertia ie automatic
when the time rate of change s-(s~, ..., sK) ia given by some autonomous syatem of
ordinary differential equationa F, as s- F(s). As explained in the Appendix, some
minor technical restrictions muat be impoaed on F to ensure that s remaina in the atate
space S(e.g. that the fraction of k-players employing atrategy i remaina non-negative.)
The esaence of biological evolution ia Lhat fitter genotypes increase relative to lesa fit
genotypes. The economic analogue ia that, due to awitching behavior or to entry and
exit, fitter strategics increase relative to less fit etrategies in every population. Thia prin-
ciple, called compatibilityin Friedman (1991), implies some relationship between a fitnesa
function f and the corresponding dynamica s- F(s). For notational simplicity, restrict
attention to a single population whose strategy choices are numbered i- 1, ..., N and
let e; denote the i'h pure strategy. There are three general ways to specify compatibility
for the tates of change s; (or, alternatively, for the growth rates s;~s;) given by F. F~om
strongest to weakest, the specifications are that the s; (or s;~s;)
(a) Are proportiona! to the relative fitneases f(e;, s) - f;(s) of the available strategiea
i; or
(b) Have the same rank-orderasthe fitnesses j;(s); or
(c) Are positivefy correlated with the fitnesses f;(s).
Version (a) is the most popular in the literature. Chosing the time scale so that the
constant of proportionality is 1.0 and equating each growth rate s;~s; to relative fitneas
(defined as the fitness f(e;,s) of pure strategy i less the current population-weighted
average fitness f(s,s) -~N 1 s;f(e;, s)), one gets the system of ordinary differential
equations s; - s;f(e; - s, s), i- 1, . .., N. The literature generally refers to this specifi-
cation as replicatordynamics. Its biologicaljustification is compelling - genetic fitneas ia
measured as the relative growth rate - but as yet nobody has found any persuasive eco-
nomic rationale. An alternative implementation of (a) equates the rateof change s; in the
interior of S to fitnesa f(e;, s) relative to the simple average fitnesa f(s) - N~ f( e;, s).8
These linear dynamics s; - f(e;, s) - f(s) do have an economic rationale (Friedman,
1991, example 2, p. 642) but only in rather apecial situations.
Version (b), referred to as monotone dynamica by Nachbar (1990) and Samuelson
(1991), has attracted more attention in recent literature because of its greater generality.
In some applications it might turn out that the population fraction using third best
action sometimes grows more rapidly (or ahrinka more slowly) than that for the second
beat action, so version (c) could apply where (b) ia not valid. It turns out that even
version (c), called "weak compatibility", sufficea to enaure that every EE of F is a NE
of the underlying fitness function f(Friedman, 1991). Moreover, the set of points whose
evolutionary paths converge to a given EE (its basin of attraction) is often independent
of the choice of compatible dynamics F.
D. Some Proposed Dynamics
By now, economista have proposed dozena of dynamical specificationa, moat but not all
of which satiafy compatibility versione (b) and (c). I conclude this section with a brief,
unaystematic survey.
One natural specification is that playera make a best response to the current state.
Such dynamics can be written as s- F(s) - a(B(s) - s), where B ia (a selection from)
the best reply (correspondence) and a 7 0 is an adjustment rate parameter. See Gilboa
8c Matsui (1991) for a recent example of this type.
Perhaps the oldeat dynamical scheme is fictitious play (Brown, 1951), associated with
the individualistic interpretation of S. Nere a atate s E S represents not the fractiona of
populations currently chosing each action - since there is only one player in each popula-
tion, the íractions are trivially 0 or 1- but rather the aubjective beliefsof players about
other players' possible actions. Usually it is applied to 2-player games; for more players
it seems to tequire the strong implicit assumption that each pair of players share the
same beliefs regarding third parties. Players obaerve other players' actions each period
and consider these observations as independent identically distributed samples from rNa-
ture'sr true distribution. This (mis-specified) model yields beliefs s(t) - t-~ ~;,-1 a(u),
where a(u) is the discrete-time action profile at a previous dates u G t. Asauming players9
chose their expected best response, we have a(t f 1) - B(s(t)), so the difference equation
s(t -} 1) - ~t~s(t) t t}1B(s(t)) characterizes diecrete-time fictitioua dynamics. a The
continuous-time analogue is the ordinary differential equation 6- ai(B(s) - s), where
ai is proportional to t-~.
It turna out that fictitious play dynamica ueually converge (albeit alowly) and, when
convergent, always converge to a NE. Shapley (1964) provided an example of non-
convergence. The inherent mis-specification - action profilea are neither independent
nor identically diatributed except (trivially) at NE - together with Shapley's example
inhibited work with fictitious play dynamica for more than 20 years. Recently, however,
many variants óave appeared. Milgrom 8t Roberts (1991) keep the same general achema
(beliefs ~ actions ~ new beliefs) but loosen it conaiderably. They obtain convergence
to a subset of atates which contains Nash equilibria but not necessarily convergence to
any particular NE. Fudenberg 8c Kreps (1988, 1991) also loosen the achema somewhat
and introduce active learning - players may occasionally "experiment" with a strategy
which is not currently an expected best responae in order to learn more about their
opportunities. Thus learning in part is an active investment.
Another variant on fictitioua play is least-squares (LS) learning, popular in the
macroeconomics literature following Marcet 8t Sargent (1989). Theobjects of LS learning
are unknown parameters of a macroeconomic model, but the updating scheme, inherent
mis-specifica.tiou, and convergence properties are esaentially the same as for fictitious
play.
Other individualistic discrete-time learning models include Selten (1990), Kalai 8t
Lehrer (1990) and Jordan (1991). Selten goes one stage beyond best-reply rationality by
allowing players to anticipate that others will make the best reply to the previoua atate
- roughly speaking, the dynamic ie s~t~ - B(B(si)). Selten's "anticipatory" dynamics
will be discussed at the end of subsection 3B. Kalai and Lehrer allow full rationality
in a repeated game setting. They obtain convergence to a NE (of the repeated game)
when playera actively try to learn each other's repeated game atrategiea and begin with
BNote that the action profile a(t) can take occeaional Iarge jumpa. In Retitious play dynamiea one
generally geta á-~ 0 ae i y oo eo inertia holda with reapect to beliefa.10
sufficiently broad prior beliefs. Jotdan obtaina convergence to a stage game NE when
myopically rational players (endowed with a common prior over poesible payoff functiona)
learn the realized game by observing play. The convergence rate is exponential, rather
than O(t-') as in most other individualistic learning models.
The population learning modela vary considerably in the degree of rationality as-
sumed. Crawford (1989) assumes individual-specific replicator dynamica for learning
and obtaina non-convergence. Foster 8c Young (1990) and Arthur (1989) take stochastic
versions of the replicator and obtain convergence to NE. Canning (1990) allows traders
Bayesian rationality (with respect to the mis-specified stationary model) or more gen-
eral updating functions; a little randomization (interpreted as deaths and birtha) en-
aures convergence to NE. Kandori, Mailath 8t Rob (1992) consider stochastic dynamica
for a aingle large but finite population. The atate space therefore ia discrete and one-
dimensional, and time is also discrete. The linear fitness function (a 2 x 2 matrix) defines
basins of attraction for any compatible dynamics; the largest basin always is asaociated
with the rrisk-dominant" NE. The authors show that the state always converges to thia
NE in the limit when the stochastic disturbance ("mutationa" ) go to 0.
Matsui 8t Matsuyama (1991) produce a rational expectationa evolutionary model by
assuming large numbers of players who can switch strategies only when exogenous, ran-
domly timed (Poisson) opportunities arrive. Players each maximize the expected present
value of the payoff stream, know the model parameters and have perfect foreaight. In
the limit, as switching opportunities become more frequent, behavior convergea globally
to the riak dominant NE in 2 x 2 coordination gamea. Multiple equilibria are possible
for more general stage garnes.
The list is far írom complete but it gives an impression of the variety of recent learning
modela for games. A few general remarks may be in order. An applied economiat no
doubt would seek empirical evidence in chosing among the various models. Laboratory
data appears the obvious first place to look, but no relevant analyais yet exita. Analysis
of labotatory data is mostly informed by equilibrium models, and when occasionally a
learning model does inform the analysis it ao far has been the only model considered.
Perhaps empirical comparisons of learning models will become available in the near11
future.
Most but not all of the models propoaed satiafy the weak compatibility condition
(version (c) above). This condition (but not necessarily the monotone veraion (b)) auto-
matically holds for the best-reply and fictitious-play type dynamics. Sometimes it fails
for forward-looking rational dynamics, e.g. for initial aegmenta of Mataui 8a Matsuyama
or Jordan paths.
The information requirements are quite minimal for most of theae dynamica, usually
juat the history of own payoffs. In particular (except for Matsui 8a Matauyama, and
Jordan) players do not need common (or any) knowledge of opponents' typea or dis-
tribution of types ín order to converge to ordinary NE. This point ia emphasized in
the theoretical literature but the implication for applied models may not have sunk in:
so-calted comptete information NE can evolve even when players initially are quite igno-
rant oj each others'circumstances. The range of applicability for ordinary NE models
thereby expands at the expense of incomplete information models based on Bayeaian
Nash equilibrium.
3 Classification of Low-Dimensional Systems
Most applications will use tractable models whose state space has dimension 1 or 2
or poasibly 3. Such models permit only a limited repertoire of asymptotic behavior.
This section classifies generic behavíor~ for dynamics specified as ordinary differential
equations and mentiona some additional conaiderationa in passing.
A. Linear One-Dimensional Games
Recall that in the one-dimensional casethere is only one population ( K- 1) and two pure
strategiea (N - 2), so the state space S- {(p, 1- p) : p E [0, 1]} can be pararnetrized
by a point p in the unit interval [0,1] repreaenting the fraction of players cunently
employing the first pure strategy. The fitness function f(r, s) specifiea the expected
'That ie, I uaually ignore knife-edge caeea becauee amatl atructural ahocka (e.g. amall perturbations
of matrix elementa) will eliminate theee caeea.12
payoff to any player choosing mixed strategy r-(x, 1- x), i.e. taking the first action
with probability x and the second with probability 1- x. If f is linear in s(as well
as in r) then for some 2 x 2 matrix A- ((a;~)) it can be written as f(r,s) - rTAs -
xpaii f x(1 - p)aiz f(1 - x)Pazi f(1 - x)(1 - P)azz, where s- s(P) -(P,1 - p) and
r - r(x) - (x, l - x).
The analysis of one-dimensional evolutionary games requires little detail regarding
the dynamica F. Monotonicity and weak compatibility both reduce to saying that the
action witó the higher current payoff will tend over time to displace the action with the
lower payoff. That is, the direction of change in s- (p, l- p) is entirely determined
by the sign of the payoff difference d(s) -(1,0)'As -(0,1)'As between the first pure
strategy (1,0) and the second pure strategy (0,1) : if d(s) 1 0 then p increases and
s moves towards (1,0), while if d(s) G 0 then p decreases and s moves towards (0,1).
Rewriting the payoff difference d(s) in terma of p and the componenta of A, we get
D(P) - d(s(P)) - (1, -1)~A(P,1 - P) - (1 - P)(aiz - azz) - P(azi - aii) - (1 - P)ai - paz,
where the reduced parameters are al - alz - azz and az - azi - air.
The analysis now is transparent. Compatible dynamics will ensure that p~ 0 ae
D(p) ~ 0, so only the sign of D(p) matters. The graph of D(p) is a straight line with
intercept a~ at p- 0 and value -az at p- 1. The result is that (apart from the
degenerate case al - az - 0 in which a player is always indifferent between her two
actions) each linear payoff function falla into one of three qualitatively different types as
shown in Figure 1.
Type 1: If al, az ~ 0 then the unique root of D(p) - 0 is p' - al~(a~ faz). It is immediate
from the definitions that p' is a symmetric mixed strategy NE and it is the only NE.
More importantly for present purposes, D is downward sloping so p incteases (decreases)
whenever it is below (above) p'. Hence p' is the unique evolutionary equilibrium. That
is, for any compatible continuous-time dynamic è- F(s) we have s(t) ~(p',1 - p')
as t~ oo from any initial state s(0). The same conclusion also holds for discrete13
time (f - 0,1, 2, ...) dynamics Os(t) - aF(s(t)) on S if we add the proviso that the
adjuatment rate parameter a~ 0 is not too large. (We can get unstable oscillations
if p~t~ jumps too far over p'.) Well-known type 1 games include versions oí Matching
-1 1 1 2
Pennies (e.g. A- so al - as - 2 and Hawk-Dove (e.g. A- so
1 -1 0 1
ai-as-1).
Type 2: For a~,a~ G 0, the root p' - a1~(a~ f a') of D(p) - 0 is still a NE of the
associated symmetric bimatrix game, but now both pure strategies p- 0 and p- 1 are
also NE. As Figure 1 makes clear, D(p) slopes upward and is negative (positive) for
p G p'(p ~ p'), so p' is an unstable "sourcen separating the basins of attraction of the
two evolutionary equilibria p- 0 and p- 1. An economic interpretation is that each
pure strategy has increasing returns in type 2 games and decreasing returns in type 1
games. Type 2 games are often called symmetric coordination games. An example is
A-~~ 1~.
Type 9: If D(p) lies on or above (on or below) the p-axis for all p E (0,1), then the
second pure strategy p- 1(the first pure atrategy p- 0) ia dominant. Of course,
the dominant strategy is the unique NE and the unique evolutionary equilibrium for
any sign-preserving dynamic F. This type of game is characterized by al - a~ G 0(and
~ a~ ~ f ~ az ~1 0). The most interesting example ia Prisoner's Dilemma, in which payoffs
( 1 -1 1
decrease as the dominant strategy becomes more prevalent, e.g. A- I` II so
a1--az--1.
B. Two-Dimensional Systems: The Asymmetric Case
Recall that there are two types of two-dimenaional state apaces. The first, the square
S-[0,1~~, arises in two-population, two-strategy games (K - 2, N~ - N~ - 2). In the
so-called asymmetric case with linear fitness functions and no own population effects,
only three types of behavior are possible. Recall that in thia case there are 2 x 2 matrices
2 014
A and B such that j~(r, s) - rTAs~ and j~(r, s) - rTAs~. Define the reduced parameters
a~ - alz - az~ and aZ - a~~ - al~ as before, and analogously define 61 - b~z - bzz and
á! - bz~ - 6t1. The Appendix derives the following clasaification, illustrated in Figure 2.
Cases 3- x and x- 3 (Corner): If al and a~ have opposite signa, then there is a
dominant strategy for the first population. The unique EE is an endpoint of the edge
corresponding to the first population all adopting the dominant strategy and the second
population making a best response. See Panel A of Figure 2. The same characterization
applies whenever 6~ and b~ have opposite signa; of course, then the edge corresponds to
the second population all adopting their dominant strategy.
Cases 1- 1 and 2 - 2(Saddle): If all reduced parameters are positive then there is a
completely mixed NE aL s' -((p', 1 - p'), (q',1 - q')), where p' - a~~(a~ ~ az) and
q' - bl~(bl ~ bz). This NE is a saddlepoint of the dynamics. There are two pure strategy
NE, both also EE, at the corners (p,q) -(1, 0) and (0,1) of the square. Their basins of
attraction are separated by the saddlepath to s'. See Panel B of Figure 2. If all reduced
parameters are negative then the result is the same except the EE are at the corners
(1,1) and (0, 0)
Cases 1- 2 and 2- 1(Center): If a; are both positive and 6; both negative, then s' is
the unique NE. The time path of every other initial state spirals around s' clockwise.
See Panel C of Figure 2. Whether s' is asymptotically stable (an EE) depends on
the dynamic specification. In version (a) - e.g. replicator or linear dynamics - s` is
neutrally stable and the spirals are closed orbits (cycles). Versions (b) and (c) allow
outward spirals (unstable) or inward spirals (EE). The case in which the parameters 6;
are both positive and the a; are both negative is the same except that the spirals are
counterclockwise.1.5
Remarka:
1. Zeeman (1980) en Hofbauer 8t Sigmund (1988) offer fairly complete clasaificatioas
for one-population linear gamea under replicator dynamica.
2. For replicator dynamics there is an intereating generalization which appliea to
higher dimensional ~asymmetric" (linear, no own-population effecta) casea. It can
be shown that the dynamics are volume-preserving (Hofbauer 8t Sigmund, 1988,
Ch. 27) so internal NE (i.e. completely mixed atrategy NE) can never be EE.
Such NE are either saddlepoints or neutrally stable centers.
3. Zeeman (1980) offera a fairly complete clasaification for one-population linear gamea
under replicator dynamica.
4. Selten ( 1990) notea that the lack of internal EE applies to discrete-time linear dy-
namics as well as continuous time replicatot dynamics. He ahowa that "anticipatory
learning" can stabilize the Center casea and higher dimenaion analoguea. Roughly
apeaking, if the linear dynamica are 6, - L(s) then the anticipatory dynamics are
6, - L(s ~ L(s)).
5. It may be worth emphasizing that the one-dimenaional linear game with payoff
matrix A (and payoff matrix A' for the opponent in a pairwiae random matching
setting) is not equivalent to the two population ~asymmetric" game (A; A'). Take
a type 1 matrix, say A- I 1 0
J.
We have seen that the one-dimeneional game
` 2 1
has a unique NE and a unique EE at p' - a~(afó) -(2-1)~((2-1)~-(0-(-1))) -
~. The two-dimensional game (A; A') falls into case 1- 1. Its interior NE at
(p,q) - (s, ~) is not an EE, but its two corner NE at (p,q) - (1,0) and at (0,1)
are EE. This is analagous to behavior in one dimensional gamea of type 2, not
type 1.16
Other Two-Dimensional Syatems
Consider now the possibility of own-population effects in linear fitness functiona on the
square. As shown in the Appendix, it ia atill true that there ia at most one interior
NE. In addition to the saddle and center cases already encountered, two further types
of behavior, called source and sink in Figure 3, are poasible at an interior NE. The
Appendix shows that some fitness functions have an interior NE which is an EE (a sink
or atable center) for any compatible dynamic, while for other fitneae functiona the interior
NE is a source or unstable center for every compatible dynamic and therefore never an
EE. As with the center case illustrated in Figure 2C, there are also fitness functions for
which some compatible dynamics make the interior NE and EE and other compatible
dynamics make it unstable (not an EE). For simplicity I retain the same label, center,
for this case, even though the range of compatible behavior now includes aources and
saddles as well as stable and unstable spirals. Behavior along the edges of the aquare
can exhibit all the main one dimensional cases, depending on the fitneas function.
Recall that linear games on the triangle are apecified by a fitness function f(r, s) -
rTAs, where A -((a;~)) is a 3 x 3 matrix. By varying the a;~'s, one can get every type
of generic behavior - a dominant strategy (so the conesponding corner is a global sink
and therefore an EE), a dominated strategy so paths converge to the opposite edge of
the triangle, or an interior NE. All four types of behavior illustrated in Figures 2BC
and Figure 3- saddle, center, source and sink - are possible at an interior NE. All three
types oí behavior illustrated in F'igure 1 are possible along the edges of the triangle.
Allowing non-linear fitness functiona int.roducea fewer practical complicationa than
one might suppose. First consider one-dimensional games. The payoff difference D(p) -
f(el - e~, s(p)) between the two available pure strategies can cross the paxis several
times. These crossing points (sometimes augmented by one or both endpoints p- 0,1)
constitute the NE of f. Generically the crosaings are transverse - the tangent to D(p)
is not horizontal at the roots p` of D(p) - 0. The analysia reducea locally to the linear
cases illustrated in Figure 1, and an interior NE p' is an EE (a separator) whenever
D'(p') G 0 (, 0). Hence the NE points typically alternate as EE and as points
separating the basins of attraction for adjacent EE, as illustrated in Figure 4.17
In the absence of own-population effects, non-linear games on the aquare (K - 2, Nl -
Nz - 2) aimilarly reducea locally to the corresponding linear ("aeymmetric") case as
follows. Find the roots p' to the equation 0- D~(p) - fl(e~ - ez, s'(p)) and roots q' to
the equation 0- Di(q) - fz(el -e~, s~(q)). Draw vertical lines at each p' and horizontal
lines at each q', so the square is broken down into rectangles. For generic payofffunctiona
(e.g. D;(x') ~ 0 at roots x' of D;(x) - 0) and any compatible dynamica, the situation
in each rectangle falla into one of the three linear casea ahown in Figure 2.
General non-linear models on the aquare or rectangle also reduce locally to one of
the linear cases. 'I'hat is, each interior NE is a local aource, eaddle, center or aink; it
is never an EE in the first two cases,is always an EE in the last case, and its atatus
depends on the detailed specification of dynamics in the third case. Edge and cotner NE
are either EE (local sinks) or not EE (saddles or sources) independent of the dynamic
apecification.
Behavior away from the NE can be fairly complicated in the general two-dimensional
cases. For example, there can be stable or unatable limit cyclea. "Strange attractors"
and rehaos" are possible in three-dimensional cases, or in lower dimensions for diacrete-
time dynamics. In most applied work, it suffices to identify the EE and their basina of
attraction. Empirically it will be difficult to detect systematic behavior elaewhere.
Since economists feel more comfortable specifying stage games than dynamics, it is
good to know that the EE and their basins of attraction alwaya are independent of the
choice of compatible dynamics in dimension 1 and in three of four cases in dimension 2.
In state spaces of dimension 3 and higher the dynamic specification matters in a larger
íraction oÍ cases.
To aumrnarize, one can be fairly epecific about the NE and posaible asymptotic
behavior in one and two-dimensional continuous-time evolutionary gamea. Ae long as
the dynamic specification is an ordinary differential equation compatible with the fitneas
function and the fitnesa function is qualitatively unaffected by tiny structural ahocka,
then there are very short lists of posaibilities for local behavior. The lists apply globally
when the fitness function is linear. For dimension 1, the list of three posaibilitiea is
illustrated in Figure 1. For dimension 2 and no own-population effects, there are three18
possibilitiea, two involving interior NE, illuatrated in Figute 2. Allowing own-population
effects on the square or on the triangle introducea two additional possibilities for interior
NE, illuatrated iu f~igure 3. lu every case except one (Figure 2C) the atatus of the NE
as an evolutionary equilibruim (EE) or not is determined entirely by the fitnesa function
and is independent of the choice of compatible dynamic.
4 An Economic Application
A considerable body of recent literature contrasta the new flexible "Japanese" mode to
the traditional hierarchical American mode of organizing a manufacturing firm. Based
largely on a literature review, Friedman 8a Fung (1992) characterize firme' choices be-
tween two alternative modes A and B. The profitability of each mode depends on the
fraction p of firms adopting mode A, as well as on a parameter vector z incorporating
general cost and demand conditions. In present notation, the fitness function is f(r,p; z),
where r-(1, 0) (or r-(0,1)) corresponds to the pure strategy of adopting mode A(or
B).
Fitneas (profitability) depends on p for two economically diatinct reasona. First,
"network" and "skimming" effecta in input markets create externalities that raise costa
more for B firms Lhan for A firms as A firms become more prevalent. a Absent other
effecta, we then have D'(p) ~ 0, where D(p) - f((1, -1), p; z) is the profit advantage of
A firma. Second, additional competition in the output market from a firm of the same
type may lower profit more than competition from an additional firm of the other type.
This nglut" effect will increase D'(p) for p near 0 and decrease it for p near 1. The
strength of these effects as well as the height of D depends on the parameter z which is
assumed to be constant most of the time. s
Assume that the network~skimming effects predominate at interior NE, so that if
eNetwork effecte are pecuniary externalities due to relationa with auppliera and cuetomers, and
skimming effects involve pecuniary externalitiea in the labor market. See Friedman dt Fung (1991) and
the referencea therein.
9That ie, ahifts in z are sufficiently emall and~or infrequent so that observed atates are very cloee to
some EE, aesuming the initial state lies in that EE'e baein of attraction.19
D(p') - 0 and 0 G p' G 1 then D'(p') ~ 0. Then we have eliminated Type 1 (interior
EE) modela. Analyais is uninteresting when one mode dominatea (Type 3), so we
presume that the parameter vector z is auch that we have Type 2 behavior. That is, if
the fraction of firms uaing the A mode initially ia more (less) then p' then ultimately all
(no) firma use the A mode.
Now consider two countries in sutarky. The state ia a point (p,q) E [0,1]~, where q ia
the fraction offoreign firms using the A mode. Under preaent assumptiona the dynamica
are of the type shown in Figure 3B: all corners are EE and the mixed NE(p', q') is a
source (not a NE).
Next, allow international trade in outputs only. Transnational glut effects become
possible but trananational network~skimming effecta are not posaible in the absence of
international trade in inputs. Very small glut effects have no qualitative effect on behav-
ior. As transnational glut effects intensify ( represented by reductions in transportation
or Lariff coats in the parametcr vector z) qualitative changea (bifurcatione) eventually
occur. Friedman 8t Fung (1992) show that the result is a configuration qualitatively
similar to Figure 2B: EE at two cornera (0,1) and ( 1,0) whose basins are separated by
the saddle path to the interior NE(p',q').
The last exercise begins with perfect free trade, defined as trananational transactiona
coats equal to national transactions coats for inputs as well as outputa. In thie case
we effectively return to the one country, Type 2 model with respect to the comóined
population of firms. Translated into the state space [0,1]~, the picture is EE at the
corners (0,0) and (1,1) whose basins of attraction are separated by the P' isoquant,
where P' is the internal (separating) NE in the one-country representation. Small
perturbations of the perfect free trade parameter vector do qualitatively affect the picture
because it is a knife-edge case. However, it is not difficult to see that small international
trade irictions create one or inore saddle NF, on the separatrix and that the EE remain
at (0,0) and (1,1). That is, when strong transnational network~akimming effecta are
allowed in addit.ion to the glut effects, the corner NE reverae their stability properties.
The complementary specialization equilibria ( 1,0) and (0,1) become unstable and the
identical specialization equilibria (0,0) and (1,1) become stable.20
The implications for trade policy may come as a surprise. Suppoae that in autarky
both modes are viable (i.e. Type 2 parametera) for both the US and Japan. International
trade in goods only is likely to lead to more complete specialization, i.e. all A in the US
and all B in Japan. R,emoving trade barriers for capital and labor inputs will change
the situation. To the extent that the US ia larger than Japan, the initial state (inherited
from the regime with input trade barriers) ia likely to be in the basin of attraction for the
EE at (0, 0). That is, the B mode may no longer be viable in Japan due to trananational
network~skimming effects. The presumption is that world production eíficiency thereby
suffers.
5 Discussion
Many interesting economic issues can be modeled in terms of interactions among a few
diatinct populations, each with a few alternative actiona. If entry and exit or learning
tends to increase the prevalence of higher-payoff actiona over time in each population,
then an evolutionary game model may be appropriate. Time patha in auch models quite
generally converge to evolutionary equilibria (EE), a subaet ofthe Nash equilibria for the
underlying atage game. 1'he initial state, given by hiatorical circumstances, determines
which F.F, is attained when there is more than one.
Eventual aggregate behavior can be classified when the dimension of the state space
(the number of alternative actions less one, summed over the number of populations) is
low. Even when non-linear interactions (e.g. market interactions) are admitted within
and across populations, the list of behavioral possibilities is rather short. Section 3
provides a list of three local possibilities (global possibilities for linear stage games) for
dimension 1, three possibilities for dimension 2 given no own-population effects, and two
more posaibilities when own-population effects are allowed.
Classifications may be of direct interest to applied economists, but their indirect util-
ity may be even larger. Knowing the classification (and the basic economic structure)
enables the applied economist to predict the qualitative effects of aizeable ahocks or
regime changes. Section 4 used this techi~ique in a simple model oí the internal organi-21
zatiun of firni~ tu pn~li~~t tbo ~,ffirt of first olx~uing tradc in outputx only and then the
quite different effect of opening trade in inputa.
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A Non-linear One-dimen9ional Game
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Appendix: Analytical Details
Begin with linear games on the square, K- 2 and Nl - N~ - 2. R.ecall that the
fitness iunction then has a representation of the form fl(r,s) - rT(Asz ~-Csr) and
f~(r, s) - rT(Bsr t Ds~), where Y- A, B, C, D are 2 x 2 matricea ((y;~)) and the curtent
state s-(s~, s~) can be written sr -(p, l- p) and s~ -(q, l- q) for (p, q) E [0,1]~.
Define the payoff advantage of the firet pure atrategy in population i by D'(p,q) -
Í~((1, -1),((P,1 - P),(q,l - 9))),i - 1,2.
The dynamics are specified as ordinary differential equations (p - Fl(p,q),q -
F~(p,q)). Trajectories (p(t),q(t)) under the given dynamics (also known as solution
curves or evolutionary paths) are solutions to the ODE with given initial conditions
p(0) - po and q(0) - qo. I impose the substantive assumption of compatibility and two
technical restrictions to ensure well-defined trajectoriea. Specifically I require that the
dynamics (i) vary smoothly with the state, (ii) have trajectories that do not leave the
state space, and (iii) are weakly compatible. For the squarer, theae properties ca.n be
formalized as follows:
Definition A dynamic F: [0,1]z --~ R~ is admissible if
(i) it is continuously differentiable,
(ii) Fl(O,q) ? O,Fr(l,q) C O,F~(p,0) 1 0 and F~(p,l) C 0 for all (p,q) E [0,1]~, and
(iii) sgnF'(p,q) - sgnD'(p,q) whenever pq ~ 0.
Recall that the sign function sgn(x) is equal to fl, -1 or 0 as x is positive, negative or
zero.
First consider the "asymmetric" case C- D- 0. As noted in the text, Dl(p,q) -
(-1,1)A(q, l - q)T -(1 - q)ar - 9a~, where a~ - ar~ - azz and as - azr - alr, is
independent of p. Similarly, DZ(p, q) -(1 - p)bl - pbs ia independent of q becauae there
~See ~iedman (1991) for more general definitione.29
are no own-population effects. Consequently admiasible dynamica take apecified aigne in
the rectangular regions of [0,1~~ bounded by the linea D'(q) - 0 and D~(p) - 0.
The analysis is elementary and falls into several cases depending on the signs of the
a; and 6;. I ignore several cases where some a; or 6; is zero becauae they are tedious and
non-generic. Other cases are labelled 1-x (respectively x- 1) if a; (respectively 6;) are
both positive, 2- x(respectively x- 2) ií a; (respectively b;) are both negative, and
3- x(reapectively x- 3) if alaz G 0(respectively blóz G 0).
Begin with case 3- x. Then population 1 players have a dominantstrategy because
D'(q) ~ 0 or G 0 on the interior of the square. Consequently all trajectoriea tend
towards the edge of the square p' - 0 or p' - 1 corresponding to the dominant strategy.
If D~(p') 1 0(G 0) then clearly the upper end (lower end) of this edge ia the limit of
every trajectory as t ~ oo. Thus it is the unique EE for any admissible dynamic. The
same analysis and conclusion holds for case x- 3: the unique EE is the right or left end
of the edge corresponding to the dominant strategy q' - 0 or q' - 1 as D'(q') 1 0 or
G 0.
In the other cases the a;'s have the same sign, so D'(q) - 0 for q' - a~~(a~ ~- a~) E
(0,1), and likewise D~(p) - 0 for p' - b~~(6~ ~6~) E(0,1). The point (p', q') obvioualy is
a NE because both actions are equally fit tor each population at this point. The vertical
and horizontal lines through (p',q') divide the square into four quadranta (rectanglea)
in which the signs of p and q are constant.
Consider case 1- 1 and an initial state in the NE quadrant. Since q] q' and
a~, a2 ~ 0, we have Dl(q) G 0 so p G 0; and since p 1 p' and bt, bz ~ 0 we have
D~(p) G 0 so q G 0 for any admissible dynamic. Conditions (i) and (iii) of admieaibility
then imply that the trajectory must either leave this quadrant in finite time or converge
to its SW corner (p',q'). Similarly2, a trajectory starting in the SW corner must either
leave the quadrant in finite time or converge to (p', q'). On the other hand, trajectories
starting in the SE quadrant have p~ 0(since q G q') and q G 0 for any admissible
~A note for the technically-minded reader. Conditiona (i) and (iii) are ueed to bound I P I f I 4 I
away from zero outaide of a neighborhood of the point (p', q'), to eneure exit in finite time when not
on the saddle path.30
dynamic. Hence such trajectories cannot leave the quadrant. For N any neighborhood
of (1,0) in the square p and q are bounded away from zero outaide of N and therefore
must enter N in finite tirnc. Hence (1,0) is an EE for any admiesible dynamic F. The
same argument eatablishea that the NW quadrant is contained in the basin of attraction
for the EE(0,1). The characterization in the text for the case 1 - 1 is completed by
noting that the sets of points which leave the NE and SW quadranta are disjoint and
aeparated by the saddle path to (p`, q').
The argument for the case 2- 2 characterization is analogous. Straightforward sign
checks on D' show that admissible trajectories in the SE and NW quadrants relative
to (p', q') consist of a saddlepath separating trajectories that leave these quadrants, and
that the NW and SE quadrants lie respectively in the basins of attraction for the EE
(1,1) and (0, 0).
Cases 1- 2 and 2- 1 do not permit such definite concluaiona. In case 1- 2 we have
p G 0 and y ~ 0 in the NE quadrant. A trajectory beginning in this quadrant must leave
in finite time and enter the NW quadrant, since p can be bounded away from zero along
the trajectory. For analogous reasons, trajectoriea beginning in the NW quadrant muat
exit it in finite time for the SW quadrant, hence to the SE quadrant and back to the
NE quadrant. A straightforward partition-of-unity construction as in Friedman (1991,
p. 664) demonatrates admissible dynamics for which (p',q') is the global EE and other
admissible dynamics for which all trajectoriea diverge from (p', q'). This completea the
"asymmetricr case characterization.
Next consider the more general linear case with C, D~ 0. Now DI(p, q) is a general
linear function whose slope ccefficient for p depends on c;~ in the same fashion as ita q-
coefficient depends on a;~; similarly for D~(p, q). NE (and hence EE) can occur only at
intersections of the edges of the square and the lines [D'(p,q) - 0]. Interaectiona at the
edges and corners can be analyzed using the one-dimensional state space clasaification.
Intersections of the lines in the interior oí the square are automatically NE for the same
reason as in the asymmetriccase. Unfortunately the elementary sign-checking procedures
are insufficient to characterize behavior because the lines are not generally vertical or
horizontal.31
To characterize the stability of an interior NE (p', q'), use atandard eigenvalue tech-
niques. Any admissible dynamic evaluated at this point can be written p - aD'(p,q)
and q-~3D~(p,q) for some a,~3 ~ 0 by admisaibility properties (i) and (iii). Then the
Jacobian matrix is
J-
( 8F'~8p 8F'~8q 1- (-cr(cr ~ cz) -a(at t az) 1
8F2~aP aF~~a9 -Q(bt f bz) -Q(dr t ds)
The characteristic roots (eigenvalues) are the solutions at, a~ to the equation ~ J- al ~-
0. By appropriate choice of the A, B, C and D matrices and the a and ~ ccefficients one
can get any desired real or complex-conjugate values for the a; and therefore every sort
of stability behavior 3. The two generic possibilities not yet encountered are a; both real
and positive (e.g. A- B - 0 and c;, d; ~ 0), and a; both real and negative. In the first
case, standard techuiques show that (p',q') is a source - all trajectories beginning near
it move away, and that it is a sink (EE) in the second case. See Hirsch 8t Smale ( 1974),
for example, for the well-known but non-elementary analysis.
Some elaboration of this point may prevent confusion. Recall that the sum of the
eigenvalues is the trace of the Jacobian matrix J and the product is the determinant of
J. When det J is negative - i.e. when cd C ab where x - xt f xz for x - a, b, c, d-
then all compatible dynarnics produce saddles. When the determinant is positive and
c and d are both positive, then tr J --(ac t Qd) G 0 for all compatible dynamics
(~, (i ~ 0) so any interior NE is always an EE - it is either a sink or a stable center.
Likewise, when c and d are both negative we have tr J 1 0, so (when the determinant
is positive) any interior NE must be unstable (a source or an unstable center). When
c and d differ in their signs and the determinant is positive we have a generalization of
the center case - the sign oí tr J is not determined and careful choice of compatible
dynamics can produce sinks and sources as well as stable or unstable centers. As an
example of this ~c.neralized center, chose matrices so that a- -c - d--1 and b- 0.
3The reader can verify that when C- D- 0, the characteristic equation is of the form a' - y.
Il~~ucr wh~~n y ~ 0 th~~ nx~ls arc n,al auJ of uppoxite eign (yi~,lding a xaddM) and wltcn y G 0 the roola
are purely imaginary (yielding a center).32
The reader can verify that an interior NE is a source for a-~'1 - 0.1, a sink for
o- Q-1 - 10 and a neutral center for a- ~1 - 1.
Analysis of linear games on the triangle (K - 1, Nl - 3) involvea a 3 x 3 matrix
A specifying the fitness function f(r, s) - rTAs. Writing s-(p, q, 1- p- q) and
r-(x, y, l- x- y), one can tediously derive a 2 x 2 matrix B e.t. f(r(x, y), s(p,q)) -
(x,y)B(p,q)T, where the components b;~ are linear combinationa of the a;~. The three
lines D'~(p, q) - f(e; - e„s(p, q)) - 0 define indifference between each pair i~ j of
the three strategies. Intersections of the edges (p - 0, q- 0 and p t q- 1) and these
lines contain the NE. Again analysis of the atability statua on edges reduces to the
one-dimensional cases. Analysis of interior NE (intersections of two of the lines implies
a 3-way intersection) again reduces to finding eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix. The
matrix components come directly from A(via B) when replicator or linear dynamics are
assumed - see Taylor 8L Jonker (1978), for example. Allowing more general compatible
dynamics only increases the degrees of freedom. Therefore any interior NE stability
properties desired - center, source, sink or saddle - can arise by suitable choice of A.
This Appendix has been explicit only for linear fitness functions. Non-linearitiea
already are allowed for in the dynamics, so not much needa to be changed for non-linear
fitness functions. The main possibility is that there may be several interior intersectiona
of the D' - 0(or D'~ - 0) lines, so the argumenta apply locally, not necessarily globally.
See Hirsh ét Smale, 1974, for general techniquea for local characterizations in terms of
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